The premise of this discussion is that private equity players intend to create real options that maximize the value derived from potential movement in the worth of the underlying business platform. This intended maximization occurs when the current value of the exercise instrument equals the current value of the underlying asset (so the option is at the money). It is also clear that when the time horizons of different arrangements tend to be consistent (as tends to happen in private equity arrangements) the attraction will be for higher volatility. The actions often criticized in the media are readily understandable in this context. For example, private equity is criticized for "borrowing heavily to buy companies, breaking them up, and selling off the pieces at huge profits."
Introduction
The premise of this discussion is that private equity players intend to create real options that maximize the value derived from potential movement in the worth of the underlying business unit (movement potential increases with more time to expiration or more volatility). Within option pricing theory it is clear that this intended maximization occurs when the current value of the exercise instrument equals the current value of the underlying asset (so the option is at the money).
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This condition maximizes the difference between the value of the option and the lower bound-let us call this difference the "moneyness profit." It is also clear that when the time horizons of different arrangements tend to be consistent (as tends to happen in private equity arrangements) the attraction will be for higher volatility. The real options that private equity arrangements create tend to be straightforward:
• Each of the acquired business units is the underlying asset for a real option.
• The exercise price is the value of the debt or other obligations that must be repaid upon exit from the business unit.
• Time to expiration is established by the agreements among the partners and the other investors in the private equity package.
• Exit from a business unit usually does not occur before the debt associated with the initial acquisition has been retired (this preserves the relationships needed in order to continue doing future deals). Thus the exercise price for the exit may actually be zero, when the private equity firm is not obligated in connection with the debts accrued after the acquisition by the portfolio company.
It has been popular, though, to criticize private equity players for the very things that maximize the moneyness profit of their arrangements. For example, when Business Week discussed the Burger King IPO the author included the following statement:
"The coming Burger King IPO offers a window onto the clubby world of cashrich private-equity players and how they make their billions. During the 1980s, firms such as Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. and Blackstone Group LP borrowed heavily to buy companies, broke them up, and sold off the pieces at huge profits.
… Nowadays private-equity firms often spend hundreds of millions of their own money on an acquisition. Just as often, though, they load up the companies with debt and use the money to pay themselves special dividends and other fees that allow them to profit even if the company itself struggles. Then the backers take the company public, often pocketing the lion's share of the offering." theory that result is worth more than the starting point. 4 Then of course they exercise the options when appropriate and sell off pieces.
Likewise it is readily understandable that private equity would "load up the companies with debt and use the money to pay themselves special dividends and other fees that allow them to profit even if the company itself struggles." Upon acquisition of a new business platform (perhaps composed of multiple business units) the private equity firm has paid a substantial premium for an option on a portfolio. After separating it into multiple options on different business units, the private equity firm might understandable want to sell assets that don't need to be owned (but could be leased instead), thereby reducing their equity investment and bringing the options closer to the money. Then additional borrowing (and payment of dividends to the private equity firm) further reduces the equity investment and might raise the exercise price, again bring the options closer to the money.
In order to illustrate the nuances of private equity arrangements as real options, we include discussions of three recent cases, each illustrating one of the common paths followed in private equity. The subsequent agenda for Riverside would be to repay the debt incurred for the acquisition, use its resources to further strengthen and build QualServ, withdraw dividends and fees to reduce its equity investment, and guide it toward a successful exit via an IPO. These steps can be seen readily in terms of bringing the option closer to the money and enhancing the potential for the underlying asset to increase.
Part of the volatility that attracted Riverside arises from an assessment of the potential for the whole restaurant industry. In its press release announcing the acquisition, Riverside included a quote from Robert Fitzsimmons, Managing Partner in Riverside's New York office: "As we all get busier and eat out more often, restaurant sales are expected to continue to grow. According to the National Restaurant Association, food dollars spent outside the home are expected to increase from 49% today to 53% by 2010. So we expect QualServ's business to be equally robust in keeping with this trend." In describing what they do, the two co-chief executive officers of Riverside
Company offered the following objectives: "In order to succeed in today's small LBO market, we focus on making companies quantitatively bigger AND qualitatively better in a number of ways:
• Increase the caliber of management and processes used.
• Add value via access to operating expertise.
• Purchase add-ons and integrate them quickly and effectively.
• Establish a board of directors for oversight and input, recruiting industry veterans and retired CEOs.
• Innovate in areas like product development, customer and product pruning, pricing and geographical growth.
• Source, sell and operate in Asia."
They continued, writing: "While many of these concepts were considered fairly innovative just a few years ago, today they are viewed as routine when increasing the value of portfolio companies. At Riverside, we embrace this process of improvement as we focus on opportunities to evolve as better owners."
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To an aficionado of real options, this sounds like a course of action aimed at enhancing the values of the real options they possess.
Further evidence that Riverside actively seeks acquisitions with high potential for increased value (high volatility) can be perceived in the following quotation from the QualServ is a leading full-service provider of foodservice equipment, fabrication and supplies, providing one-stop, turnkey products and services to major restaurant chains, their franchisees, and major retail chains. QualServ provides the ability to completely outsource the build-out, remodel and re-supply of foodservice establishments, by providing an integrated service package consisting of design, sourcing and consolidation, customized fabrication, staging, and installation.
As one of the five largest companies in its industry, and one of the few to provide full in-house fabrication capabilities along with a national value-added distribution/installation network, QualServ has established a position as a primary supplier to nearly half of the top twenty foodservice chains in the industry, including
Applebee's, Dunkin Donuts, and Burger King.
QualServ, headquartered in Kansas City, was formed through the acquisition of five separate foodservice equipment and supply companies in 1997 and 1998. The businesses that joined together to form QualServ are among the largest, oldest and most successful foodservice equipment and supply businesses in the nation. Through consolidating these separate businesses into a single, integrated operation, QualServ is now one of the five largest full-service FE&S providers in the industry.
QualServ has differentiated itself as a one-stop provider of the widest range of products and services, from design through installation, in the industry. Its products and services include:
Computer aided design (CAD) generated drawings and store layouts;
(ii) Fabricated stainless steel food preparation and service equipment;
(iii) Fabricated wood and laminate countertops, bars and cabinets;
(iv) Purchased/consolidated kitchen equipment (ovens, refrigerators, fryers, etc.) and smallwares (pots, pans, ceramic and glassware, etc.),
Complete furniture packages and interior design, and (vi) Staging, delivery and installation of the entire turnkey package.
QualServ is able to serve as a one-stop shop for the largest chains in the industry, distinguishing the Company from our competitors who typically lack the depth and breadth of products and services offered by QualServ.
By consolidating into a single, powerful entity, QualServ can take advantage of the benefits of being a leading national provider of a full breadth of products and services, while, at the same time, retaining the individual strengths and customer service-driven approach of each of our locations. Management believes this enhances the company's market position in servicing larger national accounts as well as smaller regional customers.
The Case of Hawker Beechcraft
Hawker Beechcraft Inc. provides an example of a private equity acquisition of a high-potential division from a large corporation that is not willing or able to focus Raytheon had begun seeking a buyer for its aircraft subsidiary several years before.
It had sought to sell the division for an asking price of $4 billion, shopping it unsuccessfully to General Dynamics, Dassault Aviation, Textron (which owns Cessna 8 Washington-based investment fund Carlyle Group also declined to bid at that time.
Then Raytheon got busy grooming its aircraft subsidiary. On August 11, 2001
Raytheon announced the first flight of the Hawker Horizon at its Wichita, Kansas production facility. in Phoenix, Ariz., where he was an avionics expert for customer support and training.
Meyer also served in the United States military as a flight lead F-16 pilot in the U.S. Air
Force, Air National Guard. 14 Such a move would be designed to help lift the value of the underlying asset in the private equity firms' option.
The Case of Chrysler Corporation
The Chrysler case offers a worthwhile opportunity the challenge students to discuss the potential benefits of private equity ownership in a turnaround situation. Given the nature of the real options they hold, and the incentives to enhance the option values by trimming costs, stimulating growth, and bringing the options closer to the money, the private equity owners have powerful encouragement to cure what ails the company. In
Chrysler's case, the obvious ills are ballooning legacy costs, entrenched dealers, and sluggish new product development. These all become clear targets under private equity ownership.
Concluding Remarks
Starting with the premise that private equity players intend to create real options that maximize the value derived from potential movement in the worth of the underlying business unit, we have considered the obvious steps revealed by option pricing theory.
First, of course, private equity investors would seek acquisitions that offer high upside potential, with downside controllable via financial engineering. Then after the acquisition they would seek to move the value of the underlying close to the current value of the exercise instrument. This condition maximizes the difference between the value of the option and the lower bound-we have called this difference the "moneyness profit."
Using this linkage to option analysis, we have argued that certain often-criticized actions associated with private equity deals are readily understandable in terms of the motivation to maximize the values of the real options the private equity owners have in hand.
Even before exiting, the private equity players separate the acquisitions into business units and asset pools (see Exhibit 1 for a picture). This changes an option on a portfolio into a portfolio of options, and we know from option pricing theory that result is worth more than the starting point. Then of course they exercise the options when appropriate and sell off pieces.
We have considered three recent cases that help illustrate the nuances of private equity arrangements as real options. The case of QualServ Corp illustrates two steps in the process of transforming small family businesses in large presences in their industry.
It begins with the rollup of five small family businesses orchestrated by Mercury Capital in 1998. Then after completing the consolidation, Mercury sold to Riverside Company in 2004. Riverside has continued with the rationalization and brought in new management talent, resulting in a company that is now the largest full-service entity in its industry.
The case of Hawker Beechcraft Inc. provides an illustration of how a high-potential division can be carved out of a large corporation and brought closer to full potential. The incentives to improve the value of the real options created in the private equity structure directly encourage the actions necessary to bring out the full potential value.
Last, the case of Chrysler Corporation shows how a problem-plagued entity can be carved out of a larger corporation and started along the path toward improved health.
With some of the private equity firms having gone public themselves, the possibility becomes available to test for the presence and extent of any moneyness profit. 15 If it is there, we could also test for the market response to specific actions by private equity management. We intend to pursue extensions along this line in the future.
